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Summary
This dissertation tries to discover why and on the basis of what standards
modern theories of literature and art should discriminate so rigorously between
’real’, ’high’ literature and so-called ’low’ or ’trivial’ literature. Why should
certain authors and genres be taken seriously by literary critics, whereas others
are systematically ignored or even preconceived to be anti-literary?
In finding an answer to these questions, special attention is paid to four
aspects. First, of course, the literary and aesthetic norms determining this
bipartition, this dichotomy in literature are described. Its more general ethical-
philosophical motivation and its possibly social grounds are also gone into -
aspects and argumentations that are always situated in their historical contexts.
The inquiry concentrates on the modern, 20th-century theory concerning this
problem, and especially on the ideas of Theodor W. Adorno and Pierre Bourdieu
on the nature and function of the dichotomy.
Preceding the inquiry proper, the second chapter outlines how the modern
dichotomy could originate. After a brief discussion of the literary-historical status
of the late medieval chapbook, attention is paid to the drastic changes in literary
and cultural relations at the end of the 18th century, especially in Germany and
France. The system of patronage made way for the ’free’, market-dependent
writer, and increasing literacy as well as secularization gave rise to a relatively
large reading public with little classical education and a great appetite for light,
entertaining novels and similar reading matter. These developments were sup-
ported by the introduction of large-scale reproduction techniques and of a mass
medium like the 19th-century daily (of which the serial was a vital component).
The social isolation in which many an intellectual had (perforce) found himself
after the disappointments of the French Revolution also played a part in establish-
ing the categorical division between real and bad literature.
All this is illustrated by a description of the crisis in the poetics of the early
Enlightenment, in which literature was valued for its humanizing, civilizing
effects on its readers, every human being was supposed to possess an innate sense
of taste, and the layman had just as much right to judge and speak as the expert.
In Germany the immediate cause of the change in poetics was the so-called
Modeliteratur (’fashionable literature’), which, according to the literary peda-
gogues and philosophers, was sabotaging the pursuit of civilization for all by its
exaggerations and its sensuality, considered anything but elevating. As a matter of
fact, this problem derived straight from
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the ideal of generality in the Enlightenment. And because the ’general public’
proved to be unwilling or unable to renounce its obvious need of sentiments,
sensations and what were considered to be animal enjoyments, the idea originated
that there existed two ’races’ of readers: good ones and bad ones, critical ones
and dumb ones, readers with an unselfish eye for refined and objective beauty
and those with incorrigibly gross tastes - each race with its own favourite genres.
Follows an examination of how the father of the aesthetics of autonomy,
Immanuel Kant, reacted to this development. Were his distinction between the
beautiful and the pleasant, and his notions of the universality and of the ’as-if’-
objectivity of the judgment of taste, perhaps an implicit response to the rise of the
new public? Attention is also paid to the ambivalence Friedrich Schiller felt
towards the popular Modeliteratur. Of this ambivalence little was left in the
Romantic criticism of Friedrich Schlegel and E.T.A. Hoffmann; according to
them, good poetry and popularity were mutually exclusive almost by definition,
which resulted in excluding the public from serious participation in modern
literary communication. In spite of the efforts of popular pedagogues, and of
Zola’s plea for a public-oriented and market-oriented high literature, this attitude
determined literary relations throughout the 19th century (e.g. in French Aesthet-
icism and in the later circle around Stefan George), during which the phenomenon
of ’real’, ’high’ literature was strikingly often defined in opposition to ’democra-
cy’, ’mass’, ’bourgeoisie’, ’industry’ and ’actuality’.
In the third chapter, Adorno’s point of view concerning the dichotomy is
discussed. For Adorno, the difference between what he calls ’the culture industry’
and ’authentic art’ is a sad, but perfect example of how the Enlightenment
betrayed its humanist ideals. According to the writers of the Dialektik der
Aufklärung, the Enlightenment had promised the individual adulthood, autonomy
and subjectivity, but in reality it changed him into a slavishly consuming pseudo-
subject, into a manipulable object of commerce and demagoguery - an analysis
serving the special purpose of enabling us to understand the ’ratio’ behind the
atrocities of national socialism. Essential to this view is the great, almost
unbridgeable gap that Adorno feels to exist between (human) truth and dehuman-
ized (empirical) reality, a reality that can perhaps solely be rehumanized by
radical theoretical and artistic (self)-criticism of all forms of utilitarian thought.
From this Enlightened perspective Adorno sharply criticizes all forms of
culture submitting, even if only slightly, to commerce or ideology - the more so if
they are said to gratify the wishes of the public (a public considered childish and
kept so) - since such culture more or less deliberately ’cures’ the public of the
longing for intellectual and aesthetic development. For Adorno the culture
industry is ’anti-Enlightenment’, even though he understands the
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social need of cliché entertainment, amusement and adaptation. This is illustrated
by his views on the concept of identification in aesthetic and psychological theory
- views criticized by Schulte-Sasse and Jauß.
Adorno’s complaints about the culture industry emphatically do not concern
’the masses’’ supposed desire for sensation or their bad taste; he locates the
problem in the fact that the culture industry systematically abuses, but never
satisfies, the legitimate human desire for happiness. Unlike other critics of
modern ’mass’ culture Adorno does not explain the dichotomy from the current
contrast between the intellect and the senses, which he considers to be untenable,
especially in matters of art and literature.
Nevertheless the ascetic intellect is an important moment in the evaluation of
the authenticity, of the ’truth content’, of art and literature. The main condition
for the authenticity of a work of art is its autonomy in relation to any non-artistic
utility. But this autonomy does not protect from abuse; Adorno also denounces
the ’culture consumer’, who sees art as an intellectual form of possession and
who imputes to art a ’higher’ usefulness. But he realizes as well that ’after
Auschwitz’ the pure beauty of completely autonomous art has become sterile and
therefore inauthentic, and that the respect for art possesses superstitious (unen-
lightened) dimensions. Also, the fact that even the most authentic work of art
partakes of (false) reality stands in the way of an unconditional appreciation.
Adorno solves this problem in two ways: on the one hand he no longer places
delight in beauty, but the displeasure of shock at the heart of the aesthetic
experience (which is thus de-aestheticized); on the other hand, he declares the
ambivalence of authentic art to be its essence. In seeing its autonomy as the
critical negation of any heteronomy (the heteronomy of the culture industry in
particular), art is also a fait social. This view leads to a strong preference for
ambiguous, enigmatic, difficult and inaccessible art. That is how contemporary
authentic art betrays the Enlightened ideal of generality - an effect Adorno highly
regrets. Still, for him this is not a motive to plead for an art that will adapt itself
to the public-’friendly’ techniques of the culture industry, because that would
entail abandonment of any hope that the public will ever be invited to critical
reflection.
In Adorno’s dichotomy the two parts, low and high art and literature, the
culture industry and authentic art, are to a large extent each other’s complement;
they are usually defined as each other’s contrast. At least in a qualitative sense; as
is illustrated with the aid of the category of the utopic in art (in which context
work of Bloch and Jameson is discussed), the human need of art (of the promesse
du bonheur) surpasses the boundaries of the dichotomy. But Adorno believes that
the culture industry fulfils this promise in an ’absolutely false’ way, which means
that, contrary to many of his later critics, he cannot be tempted to discover
anything positive whatsoever in its products. Therefore he may indeed be
reproached for being a very rigid theorist of the modern dichotomy. Yet it should
be pointed out that his strictness
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does not arise from any traditional aristocratic fear of the masses, or from an
intellectual need to set himself apart from the ’common people’, but from an
Enlightened concern for their fate, something which has by now become almost
unusual.
Next, the most important features of the culture industry and of authentic art
having been schematically opposed, attention is paid to the question in how far
Adorno’s analysis may be called outdated, e.g. in connection with Eco’s postmo-
dern comments on modernism (of which Adorno is an important representative)
and with Peter Bürger’s ’postavantgardism’ - two examples of not very convinc-
ing criticism. Nevertheless Adorno’s strictness remains a problem, as does his
relation to empirical reality. But, as will be shown in greater detail in connection
with Bourdieu’s theory, this may well be a sign of his being right.
The fourth chapter deals with Bourdieu’s sociological analysis of the difference
between high and low art, between culture considered to be legitimate and culture
considered to be illegitimate, as it was expounded in particular in La distinction
(1979). Bourdieu is especially interested in the social importance of (high) art and
literature, even though (and because) he knows that merely to look for this is
barbaric and blasphemous in the eyes of the supporters of the prevalent aesthetics
of autonomy. After a discussion of central concepts like ’(class) habitus’, ’charis-
matic ideology’, the metaphorical ’(cultural) capital’ and of his views on the
relation between theory and empiricism, his description of the low ’taste of the
nécessité’, the ’popular aesthetics’, is analyzed. Bourdieu explains the observed
preference of the members of the lower social classes for cultural forms focusing
on emotional identification from the functional and practical-ethical attitude to
which their lack of economic and cultural capital forces these classes. Arguing
from the opposition between form and function (which I consider a very doubtful
point of departure), he also tries to explain the popular aversion to social formal-
ities and to artistic experiments with forms, which the lower classes, not entirely
without justification, experience as ways to exclude the common people - an
analysis Bourdieu borrowed from Ortega y Gasset.
Another question discussed is why what I call the popular ’zero-culture’ should
sometimes appeal so strongly to culturally so much wealthier groups like artists
and intellectuals. Somewhat contrary to his reputation Bourdieu warns - although
not always consistently - against the romantic-populistic idea that ’the people’
have a coherent and unspoiled taste of their own. In his opinion popular aesthetics
are either a point of negative reference within the legitimate aesthetics of auton-
omy, or a strategic argument in the dispute about those aesthetics.
Basic principles of the legitimate, high, ’pure’ taste are luxury, freedom and
independence, and these can best be measured by means of their distance to
318
Summary
the restrictions that the different kinds of poverty impose upon a great part of the
population. ’Distance’ is a central concept in the bourgeois habitus, in which
individuality, originality, uniqueness, exclusiveness, singularity, etc. are positive
values, as opposed to negatively coloured ’popular’ values such as simplicity,
accessibility and generality. A certain emphasis on form and (personal) style is
also considered to be typical of the legitimate taste.
On sociological grounds Bourdieu distinguishes two conflicting varieties of the
legitimate taste, viz. the (grand) bourgeois fancy taste, and the intellectual, ’free’
taste. The fancy taste wants art to display class, solid quality, professionality,
established success and material exclusiveness, so as to express the social-
economic power of its exponent - an analysis Bourdieu (in spite of his denials)
seems to owe in large measure to Veblen’s Theory of the Leisure Class. The
’free’, Kantian taste belongs to the part of the dominant class that has hardly any
economic capital at its disposal, but does possess a considerable amount of
cultural capital: the (young) artists and intellectuals. Bourdieu holds that the social
conflict between these two class fractions about the exchange rate of their kind of
capital is the main factor determining the dynamics of culture, which is mostly
about (sometimes very indefinite and flexible) contrasts such as ’commercial
success’ versus ’acclaim by experts’; ’refined enjoyment’ versus ’asceticism’;
’complacency’ versus ’criticism’; ’tradition’ versus ’innovation’, and ’heterono-
my’ versus ’autonomy’.
Essential for Bourdieu’s view on the dichotomy is the idea that Western,
differentiated culture is driven by the (unconscious) urge to distinguish oneself
from The Others and that its movements therefore run their course according to a
’dialectic of distinction and pretension’. This cultural law is held to explain why
widely spread (’popular’) forms of art are fairly automatically despised as vulgar
by the experts. This of course evokes the question of how to relate this to the
ideal of widespread culture also advocated in high cultural circles. How the
distinction drive works is illustrated by the goût moyen (a rather problematical
concept in Bourdieu’s work) of the despised petty bourgeois or middle class,
whose fate seems to be the tragic inversion of that of king Midas’s. A social
group that Bourdieu likes even less is formed by the rising new bourgeois, who
deal in cultural merchandise and in the vulgarized ideals of the Enlightenment.
Thus, Bordieu too shows the existence of a strongly negative interplay between
the various (social) varieties of taste and culture. Yet it does not seem correct to
maintain that high art and culture can always only be meaningfully interpreted as
expressions of an aversion to popular taste: as pointed out in connection with
statements by Broch, Lotman and De Swaan, they do not only tend to exclude,
but also to integrate. That Bourdieu has overlooked this paradox may partly be




Also, it is becoming ever more doubtful whether the cultural preferences of the
lower classes are as strongly driven by an aversion to or criticism of the legit-
imate taste as seems to be the case the other way round. Is popular taste not far
more non-Kantian than consciously anti-Kantian? How ’active’ is the popular
rejection of high culture? Might art vandalism be an expression of it? Does
popular resistance express itself aesthetically as well? And what is the relation of
such an expression to Adorno’s culture industry? Or is there, perhaps, also a well-
considered culture that is generally accepted and assimilated? Does the popular
variant of taste actually take part in the cultural battle at all? Is that battle,
speaking in sociological terms, not much rather a matter of clashes between the
bourgeois taste and the intellectual taste, between the established bourgeoisie and
the new bourgeoisie?
Having schematized Bourdieu’s delineations of the most important dichotomies
and added a final comment, work by Crego and Groot is discussed in a subsec-
tion dealing with Bourdieu’s interpretation of Kant’s Kritik der Urteilskraft: his
debatable reading of that work as the conceptual foundation of the dichotomy,
particularly in connection with the distinction between the sensuously pleasant
and the formally beautiful.
The chapter ends with an attempt to situate Bourdieu’s theory in space and
time, e.g. by reflecting on the question of how ’French’ his analysis is, or on the
question of whether cultural relations have greatly altered in the thirty years since
he did his empirical research. In how far has the new bourgeoisie, then rising,
taken over in the meantime, and what has today’s ’zap culture’ left of the
differentiations based on social factors that Bourdieu was still able to observe in
La distinction? Is his theory, with its focus on the relations prevalent under 19th-
century aestheticism, not out of date? And does he not demonstrate a very
uncritical approach to conceptual oppositions like ’quality versus quantity’?
Would it not be better to make a distinction between the concepts of ’relative
quality’ and ’absolute quality’?
For the major part, the final chapter consists of a comparison of the dichotomy
theories of Adorno and Bourdieu, centring on the question of in how far these
two theories overlap, supplement and preclude each other. To begin with, their
characterizations of high and low art and literature are compared, bringing to light
that the main lines of Adorno’s dichotomy between the culture industry and
authentic art correspond with Bourdieu’s distinction between the intellectual
variant of legitimate taste and the culture moyenne of the middle classes and/or
the new bourgeoisie. Yet they differ fundamentally in their attitude towards high
art’s claim to autonomy. Also, the fact that Adorno approaches the problem
primarily from the angle of production and Bourdieu from that of reception is of
decisive consequence for their clashing views on the dichotomy. An allied




of works of art (with regard to their truth content), whereas Bourdieu is chiefly
interested in the sociological composition of their public and in their function as
regards the cultural economy. Hence their theories and conclusions cannot simply
be combined: what is essential for one, the other finds arbitrary or totally
reprehensible. Peter Bürger explains this friction from the fact that Adorno’s
argument remains within the framework of a critical-idealist aesthetics, whereas in
his equally critical role of ’barbaric’ scientific observer Bourdieu places himself
outside this framework. Adorno and Bourdieu do not only contradict each other;
they supplement each other at the same time - a conclusion Gartman has drawn
as well.
Another point of discussion is the question of how Adorno and Bourdieu
(might) judge each other. It is found, for instance, that in his description of
intellectual taste Bourdieu has not been able to take all the shades of Adorno’s
analysis into account. But the comparison of Adorno’s criticism of Veblen and of
’positivism’ with Bourdieu’s ideas also shows that Adorno has not been able to
put paid to Bourdieu’s methods in advance.
A more successful approach to reconciling at least a number of contradictions
between Adorno and Bourdieu is to view Bourdieu’s insights as a sequel to those
of Adorno’s. Thus, Bourdieu’s lack of interest in the truth content of art, his
hypotheses about the unconsciously snobistic motive in culture and his extreme
criticism of the concept of autonomy may be interpreted as tokens of the triumph
of the culture industry, as proof of Adorno’s prophetic talent. For if we see the
present-day dichotomy as a distinction organized by the culture industry, and
judge high art and literature to be a fetish with which the target group of more
highly educated consumers hope to buy (pseudo-)subjectivity, the dichotomy,
measured by ’old-fashioned’ literary-critical requirements like truth and objectiv-
ity, has indeed become arbitrary and purely affirmative - a position taken up,
albeit in other terms, by critics like Eco, Hassan and Fiedler as well. Bourdieu
does not yet go as far as these postmodernists: on this point he takes up some-
thing of an intermediate position. One might say that, on a scientific level, he
expresses the fictitious differentiation of contemporary culture, in which radically
critical, authentic art has no more part to play, or at the most an exceedingly
marginal one.
But this analysis has enormous consequences for the theoretical tenability of
the dichotomy, dealt with in my personal look at its future which forms the end
of the dissertation. Before that, the notion that all contemporary art and literature
has already collapsed under the yoke of the culture industry and no longer
possesses even a trace of criticism and/or authenticity is called in question. Also,
doubts are cast on the power of the distinction motive as well as on the thought
that all forms of distinction drive should give rise to dismay.
Next, the main props of the dichotomy are held up to the light. Thus, the
contrasts between sensuous enjoyment and intellectual enjoyment, between
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the pleasant and the beautiful, between commerce and disinterestedness, between
autonomy and heteronomy and between the masses and the élite are considered
too vague (still) to justify a rigid dichotomy.
The Enlightened generality motive too is tested for topicality, chiefly leading
to the conclusion that we should take leave of the notion, found to be naive, that
the literary value judgment is Einstimmung ansinnend in nature. This does not
entail an end to the Enlightened idea that the (critical) faculty of taste is
universally human, but it does imply that we should not actually expect or want it
to be uniform.
One requirement used by the author herself to distinguish between real
literature and bad literature is singularity. This ties in with Benjamin’s concept of
aura and the concept of the literary epiphany, in which the (subjective) suscepti-
bility of the moment is of essential importance. And of course she hopes that
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